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In this era of the Glasnost spring, when millions of people are newly able and
eager to pursue their visions of democratic government, it is useful to remind
ourselves once again of the intrinsic dilemmas that beset all consensual govern-
ment designs. For, in a democracy, each voting individual's preferences count;
yet aspirant democracies must somehow find a way of aggregating the manifold
and often mutually inconsistent choices of the many individual voting citizens
into a single set of group decisions for action, and they must do so in a manner
which is generally accepted as fair and binding, even by those who disagree with
the group's decisions. Furthermore, since there will be winners and losers in
almost any such case, a stable democracy must be able to implement its decisions
despite opposition and must also be able to enlist the confidence and loyalty of
its citizenry so as to be able to repeat democratic, fair group decision procedures
indefinitely over time and issues. Such stability is facilitated by widespread
loyalty in practice to the democratic constitution, plus confidence in the limits
placed on the government's powers to impose loss on the losers.
As the drafters of the United States Constitution recognized, reliance on the
most common democratic voting rule, "one person, one vote majority rule,"
itself implies some of the most famous of the dilemmas of democracy, including
the possible threat to the minorities from the implied "tyranny of the majority."
Since a tyranny of the minorities would be even less acceptable, the typical
democratic constitutional system relies de facto on majority rule, plus a complex
set of constitutional defenses designed to limit the government and to protect the
minorities and, also, the individual citizen.
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In this article, the term "democracy" is used loosely to mean responsible,
consensual governmental institutions.' First, we sketch some of the fundamental
challenges which regularly arise in democratic constitutional choice and some of
the most famous general rules or strategies for dealing with some of them. Then,
by surveying the actual constitutions of most of the nations, we offer what
evidence we can on the formal allegiance of the nations to some of these dem-
ocratic constitutional strategies and devices, if not of their utility in practice.
While our review of actual constitutional practice is thus reported on later, we
can note here (as others have noted) that such a review of empirical experience
in the actual use of various alternative constitutional devices goes both ways.
Successes and failures can be cited for the same type of institutional variants.
This underscores the importance to democracy of such more fundamental forces
as shared perceptions, aspirations, and commitments, and, of course, the im-
portance of history and luck. Therefore, information as to which institutional
designs the large set of recent constitutions of the world pay formal tribute is
likely to be both revealing and important; it will identify the major institutional
alternatives still regarded as legitimate and viable. 2 A few definitions and widely
accepted concepts for democratic constitutional design will provide a common
background with which to review some of the more important provisions of the
current set of actual constitutions of governments.
I. The Constitutional Dilemmas
One commonly accepted general observation is that governments and laws are
normally designed to be conflict and competition regulatory mechanisms, cre-
ating, supervising, and implementing the "rules of the game" of the intrinsic
competitions, coercively, if necessary. This view implies as a corollary that
individuals and subgroups have a significant stake in controlling the potentially
coercive institutions of government.
The risks are obvious. Yet, "in all societies, the need for binding rules is based
not on some prior legal rule, but on the shared need for survival, preferably with
decency, dignity, and some hope for a share of the amenities which civilization
offers, coupled with the desire for peace ' 3 and therefore for the regulation of
international, as well as internal, conflicts of interest.4
1. See, e.g., Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, Human Rights and the Emerging International Con-
stitution, 9 HOFSTRA L. REV. 475 (1981).
2. See id.
3. Id. at 475.
4. See generally J. COLEMAN, INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS AND COLLECTIVE ACTION (STUDIES IN
RATIONALITY AND SOCIETY CHOICE) (1986) (especially Part III: Constitutions at 305-74); CONSTI-
TUTION MAKERS ON CONSTrrUTION MAKING (R. Goldwin & A. Kaufman eds. 1988) (on France,
Greece, United States, Yugoslavia, Spain, Egypt, Venezuela, and Nigeria) Ihereinafter CONSTITUTION
MAKERSI; FORGING UNITY OUT OF DIVERSITY: THE APPROACHES OF EIGHT NATIONS (R. Goldwin,
A. Kaufman & W. Schambra eds. 1989) [hereinafter FORGING UNITYI.
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As suggested above, "[i]n all human organizations, there is a constitution, a
charter, either implicit or explicit, written or unwritten, which defines the guide-
lines and parameters for choosing the working 'rules of the game.' -5 It also
specifies the groups of politically empowered citizens who will vote and therefore
can participate actively in the political processes. It specifies the voting weights
and decision rules they will use. "In any political entity, the constitution also sets
limits beyond which the rulers may not go." 6 In so doing, it attempts to identify
impermissible government actions or unacceptable outcomes. Nevertheless, in all
systems, broad constitutional constraints on impermissible group actions, all gen-
eral limits on government action, tend to compete or even conflict.
Both in federal systems and even in essentially unitary governmental struc-
tures practicing majority-rule decision making, there are also potential conflicts
between the civil, legal, political, economic, and other basic, constitutionally
protected rights of individuals and of the various minorities and the definitive
decision-making rights of the sovereign majority. The typical objective of "en-
shrining" a formal bill of rights, as in the United States Constitution, including
specific constitutional protections for all citizens and subgroups in a society, is an
attempt to protect potentially threatened individuals and groups against coercive,
authoritative decisions of the legitimate government. "At the very least the aim
is to prevent that government from taking the specified types of actions labeled
'unconstitutional' which would otherwise allow the majority, by entirely appro-
priate decisional rules and processes, to do great and even irreparable harm to the
protected individuals and minorities."
7
In addition to the vexed initial problems of choosing an acceptable strategy of
voting weights and rules and setting limitations on offensive government actions,
there are the inevitable operational and substantive dilemmas: how to develop
people and social choice institutions that will implement society's distributive
and other decisions optimally; how to distribute honor, wealth, and power ac-
cording to relevant social and cultural standards, while keeping the elite honest
and generally acquiescent to group norms and rules.
Many writers have underlined the intrinsic operational dilemmas of designing
stable, effective, and just democratic institutions of government. 8 These
5. Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra note 1, at 475.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 480.
8. On the bases, underpinnings, and creation of a democratic polity, see B. BARBER, STRONG
DEMOCRACY: PARTICIPATORY POLITICS FOR A NEW AGE (1984); R. DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986);
R. HARE, MORAL THINKING (1981); A. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE (1981); J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF
JUSTICE (197 1); READING RAWLS: CRITICAL STUDIES ON RAWLS' A THEORY OF JUSTICE (N. Daniels ed.
1975).
On negotiations in general, see R. FISHER & W. URY, GElrING TO YES: NEGOTIATING AGREEMENT
WITHOUT GIVING IN (1981); L. SUSSKIND & J. CRUIKSHANK, BREAKING THE IMPASSE: A CONSENSUAL
APPROACH TO RESOLVING PUBLIC DISPUTES (1987). Of course, the parties do have to want, in good
faith, to achieve a resolution.
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problems include: How can we assure that the government can function effec-
tively while assuring that, in practice, the specified rights of individuals (or
groups) are defended? How can we provide maximum safety for all sections of
society against the potentially unacceptable predatory acts of the government
operating within its normal spheres of authority while, at the same time, per-
mitting that same government of the entire community to function adequately
and to achieve and defend its goals, including survival? Clearly difficult trade-
offs are implied, for example, when choices have to be made between effective
government and individual rights. The acceptable range of trade-offs itself must
be flexible: in wartime, group survival typically becomes the overwhelming
objective, and individual rights, even not to volunteer to fight, typically are
sacrificed, at least temporarily. Which organ of government, or which sets of
organs of government, will be able to assert "final say" or "ultimate sover-
eignty" in cases of conflict on constitutional issues? If such a body is specified
at the national level, who can correct that body if its decisions threaten human
rights or individual or group survival? What is the role of the rather ineffectual
international organizations and of weak international law, including the emerging
human rights law? How will such supranational protections be implemented
when nations regularly want human rights protections applied only to the acts of
other states, in part because of reasonable fears about the tyranny of the majority
at the international level and their own survival rights?
There are many well-known inherent political dilemmas at all levels of dem-
ocratic government, as there are, no doubt, at the personal level for all "sover-
eign" individuals. Therefore, all group political choice involves risk and imper-
fection. Yet humans live and grow in groups and regulate the groups they live in.
The basic dilemmas of democratic group living are ingrained and universal. They
can be explored creatively and, hopefully, can be reduced or minimized; they
cannot be wished away.
II. Reducing the Risks of Democratic Government
It is worth recalling some of the classical strategies for designing the safest
possible democratic government. Most have been discussed for centuries, in-
cluding by the founders of the United States Constitution, for example, in the
Federalist Papers. 9
A. USE OF A FEDERAL SYSTEM
The logic in support of a federal system, especially in a multiethnic democracy
of any size and complexity, is simple and direct. The division of governmental
9. On the creation of the United States Constitution, see, e.g., F. MACDONALD, Novus ORDO
SECLORUM: THE INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985); Berns, The Writing of the
Constitution of the United States, in CONSTITUTION MAKERS, supra note 4, at 119-53, and sources
cited; Glazer, The Constitution and American Diversity, in FORGING UNITY, supra note 4, at 60-84.
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tasks and functions between various levels of government from local to central,
and the devolution of issues to the lowest level at which they can be effectively
handled in a federal system, should leave issues at the level of government that
is likely to impose the minimum of coercion and potential loss on its citizenry.
In logic, also, the preference for federalism would be strongly reinforced in cases
in which the polity is large or multiethnic, or both, with diverse regional con-
centrations of ethnic groups, as in, for example, the Soviet Union and Yugosla-
via. These conditions also highlight the balancing of interests provided by a
central government's ability to impose and implement (and be limited by) a bill
of rights for protecting the minorities still stranded in all the component units
of government. This kind of power at the center is important since a review of
geography suggests that almost every political entity is composed of people of
multiple ethnic backgrounds.
The logical and real dilemmas for individualistic traditions inherent in all
coercive group-decision processes, that is, all government, reinforces the
traditional conceptual constitutional strategy of individualism, which has
regularly called for minimizing the sphere of government on each likely set of
conflict issues and at each level of government, consistent with the
achievement of other equally highly valued individual and social aims. This
strategy again supports the federal system concept of minimizing unacceptable
risks to individuals and subgroups in a highly diverse polity. It does not,
obviously, eliminate debate in each case on the appropriate mix of risks and
trade-offs at the designated level of government. Conflicts will arise.
Hopefully, this strategy would place them at a level at which common norms
can accommodate them. If so, it is likely to lead to maximum agreement on
the desirable compromise outcome and therefore impose minimum coercion
and potential loss on the governed.
In sum, it is by now well understood that all political systems must expect
frequently to have to force choices between conflicting group objectives. Quite
typically, these are espoused primarily by differing component population inter-
est groups, presumably in reflection of their own visions of their varying self-
interests at the time. As we have noted, such is the case in practice with the
conflict between national self-defense, for example, as envisaged by the domi-
nating internal political coalition in a nation, and the human rights, at very least
the right of survival, of its minorities. Indeed, in any society, the majority may,
in wartime, seriously impair the basic human rights of vulnerable subgroups, as
was the case with Japanese-Americans in World War II. Note, however, even in
that case, the importance of assuring at least the physical survival of the uncon-
stitutionally deprived group. Some subsequent reparations, and perhaps more
important, some explicit acknowledgment on the part of the offending majority
of its unconstitutional actions, are ultimately possible. This recognition should
facilitate learning from the past and can improve the future performance of the
system.
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Realistically, the tastes, biases, and interests of the dominating coalition
within a society at any time can be expected to largely determine the operational
trade-offs by its government. For although a federal strategy, plus complex
institutional checks and balances at all levels of government, can, in principle,
reduce the scope of damage from central government, it cannot be repeated too
often that no one constitutional design can, by itself, be expected to eliminate the
dangers that the elite in control of the power majority can visit on nonelite groups
at all levels of government. The risks inherent in group choice persist and
reappear at every level of government.
Unfortunately, no automatic system of clear-cut constitutional justice is at hand, or,
indeed, even feasible in principle. Constitutional justice has to be defined in each case
by human institutions, however imperfect. This ultimately is the bitter implication of all
our famous human rights-constitutional dilemmas. There are no cookbooks. Humanity
is left with the unavoidable responsibility to decide for itself, with dignity.'
And, we trust, to improve performance with experience.
B. SEPARATION OF CHURCH AND STATE
Another traditional and very important strategy for limiting the range and
power of a democratic government calls for the separation of church and state.
This separation has been achieved in modern European democracies only after
long, great internal struggles, in some cases down to this century. Some democ-
racies, like Israel, which has not been able to negotiate a written constitution, are
still struggling with this issue. Separation is not necessarily inconsistent with the
persistence of an established church as long as that church has little special
political power and discrimination against nonmembers is constrained. Some
Moslem countries deny any permissible separation between church and state.
Theocratic states, such as Iran, are obviously not democratic.
C. CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY
Another traditional strategy for limiting abuse of power by the democratic
government calls for control of the military by responsible civilian executives of
that democratic government who are ultimately responsible to the people through
the legislature. Many examples of impaired or truncated democracy, past and
current, can be attributed to the difficulty of effectively controlling and con-
straining the power of the military to usurp political control by force or threat of
force, in coups, when the military is dissatisfied with government policy or is
frequently called upon to reestablish order by a weak civilian government. A
weak civilian government is clearly a source of instability to democratic insti-
tutions, providing numerous temptations to would-be usurpers.
10. Taubenfeld & Taubenfeld, supra note 1. at 481.
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For democracy to function well and durably, neither divine inspiration nor
military power can be allowed to displace "popular" sovereignty. To generalize
from these last two traditional guidelines, for workable, democratic (responsi-
ble) government, no known subgroup should be able to usurp unchallengeable
control over the governmental organs, displacing all others disproportionately.
D. VERY BROAD PARTICIPATION IN BARGAINING,
COALITION MAKING, AND POWER SHARING
The converse of this last important generalization is very important. Stability
in a heterogeneous mass democracy depends significantly on the capacity of all
the various population subgroups and interest groups to reach mutually satisfac-
tory negotiated bargains that all these important subgroups can accept. Nation-
alism, loyalty to the country and to countrymen, and a willingness to sacrifice and
even to die for the nation can be and have been used as powerful substitute sources
of cooperation in times of emergency. In the long run, however, all subgroups with
developed political assertiveness can be expected to insist on participating in the
national political processes and the benefits therefrom. Those groups without
political assertiveness, either due to the denial of the suffrage or because they are
unorganized or unassertive politically for any number of reasons (including cultural
training and indoctrination, lack of educational opportunities, or deficiencies in other
opportunities for self-development), may be systematically exploited, in the sense
that their interests, as they see them, may not be represented adequately in the outcome
of the political bargaining processes. Once they do organize themselves for political
power, they will have to be accommodated more adequately, or social tensions will
escalate. Stability in a democracy can be expected if all important component social
interest groups are willing and able to engage in successful long-term, intergroup
negotiations for sharing of what the society has to offer.
It is crucial to note that very broad participation in government is not inevitable
and may certainly not be the elite's preference. How to achieve broad participation
remains a lively topic for the political outgroups in the United States (i.e., for
women, for minorities of color, and others). Nevertheless, long-run social sta-
bility in a democracy requires that ultimately all potentially politically important
groups are included in the political game and its payout. A purportedly democratic
polity that intends to exclude members of some major interest groups indefinitely
must seek a way ultimately to banish them permanently from the voting polity,
to exclude them physically and psychologically from political participation as
citizens, which, of necessity, means to repress forcefully any efforts on their part
to organize for their own political self-defense. This deliberate exclusion, ulti-
mately, has been the underlying rationale for apartheid in South Africa.'
11. In February 1990 the Wall Street Journal summed up the white South African position as:
'In Africa,' . . . 'one-man, one-vote equals Idi Amin.' " Wall St. J., Feb. 28, 1990, at AI0,
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Promotion of the necessary political institutions for widespread participation,
coalition making, and power sharing can be pursued by various constitutional
devices. 12 It has become commonplace to observe that chances for stability are
increased in a heterogeneous mass democracy if the population is not divided
into intense, self-contained, competitive minority groups, each focused primarily
or exclusively on achieving dominance or the full satisfaction of its own interests
at the expense of the others. Mutual understanding, religious tolerance, and
creative coalition making, and all other sources of the flexibility so useful to
effective bargaining, are more likely if the population is divided into cross-
cutting interest groups with shared or overlapping objectives, rather than by
tribal, religious, or other intense ethnic identities.
However, as current events keep reminding us, governments attempting to
build more democratic societies do not necessarily have free choice of their
population mix, or its dispersion, or its political sophistication and mutual tol-
erance. For example, the Christian Bulgarian people reportedly openly demon-
strated against recent attempts of their democratizing government to restore
religious freedom to Moslems. At almost the same time, in Soviet Asia,
Moslem-dominated republics agitated against the arrival of Christian Armenian
refugees from Azerbaijan, another focus of bitter Christian-Moslem ethnic dis-
pute. Even aside from this type of important religious breach, which carries
within it contrasting views even on the basic human rights of the communicants,
it is understandable that peoples of these and even poorer regions (for example,
the nations of the developing world), will have less experience with and less
capacity to share fairly such important but limited desiderata as leadership or
even good jobs or good housing. In short, we must expect democracy to face
special stability problems in poor countries. According to some analysts, these
countries may benefit from creative institutional innovation, such as specifically
agreed power-sharing provisions in their constitutions. 13
col. 2. No doubt the report should have noted that one man, one vote, has already led to apartheid.
Indeed, democratic institutions have not been durable in many poor, multiethnic (or multicultural)
countries of the developing world. That times change, opportunities expand, and experience teaches,
remain the hope, even for South Africa. Even in the United States, mass democracy is a twentieth
century phenomenon. The eighteenth century Constitution specifically condoned the slave trade and
accepted slavery. It also, despite Mrs. Adams's exhortation to her husband, excluded from voting
women and, through the state voting arrangements, the poor and unpropertied males.
On apartheid, see R. TAUBENFELD & H. TAUBENFELD, RACE, PEACE, LAW AND SOUTHERN AFRICA
(1968). See also infra note 23 on South Africa.
12. On power sharing, see CONFLICT AND PEACEMAKING IN MULTIETHNIC SOCIETIES (J. Montville
ed. 1990) (and Bibliography at 543-54) [hereinafter CONFLICT]. See also Lijphart, The Power-
Sharing Approach, in CONFLICT at 491-509; Steiner, Power Sharing: Another Swiss "Export Prod-
uct"?, in CONFLICT at 107-14. On power sharing and South Africa's future, see A. LIJPHART,
POWER SHARING IN SOUTH AFRICA (Policy Paper in Int'l Aff. No. 24, Berkeley: U. of Cal. Inst. of
Int'l Studies, 1985).
13. See supra note 12 and sources cited supra note 4; see also D. HOROWTZ, ETHNIC GROUPS IN
CONFLICT (1985).
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In mature democracies, especially those with relatively high incomes per
capita, what can be labelled intergroup power sharing has typically emerged
informally out of the democratic political system. A balanced ticket, reflecting
the ethnic and religious composition of the electorate, long ago became part of
the professional politician's formula for success in the United States. Classic
cases come to mind. In New York City, for example, a city of in-migration and
adversity, dominated by the Democratic Party in the post-Civil War period,
Fiorello La Guardia, an Italian, who was part Jewish and a practicing Protestant,
fluent in Italian and Yiddish, embodied, and obviously appealed to, all the major
ethnic voting blocs of the period. He won repeatedly in the 1930s and 1940s as
a Republican running on a "Fusion" ticket for "good government." Since the
United States is a nation of in-migration and is large and very diverse, power
sharing is a sensible political strategy. Thus, in elections at the national level, the
presidential candidate, once nominated, has traditionally sought a balanced
ticket. For example, a known "liberal" from a northern state will normally pick
a vice-presidential candidate from another region, probably a person with a
somewhat contrasting ideological label. Since vice-presidents of the United
States have with some regularity succeeded to the presidency, this is a genuine
sharing and not a mere gesture.
Proportional representation, another device for achieving power sharing
among all interest groups, is often espoused by analysts, especially those from
mature European democracies. 14 While it has been attempted as a system in
some local districts in the United States, it has appeared to be too unwieldy when
proposed on a wider scale. The United States is ethnically more diverse than are
European democracies, but U.S. ethnic groups traditionally have become assim-
ilated into the dominant culture and language. Yet proportional representation
reportedly works well in some cases in diverse European democracies.
Constitutionally specified (often imposed) power sharing, in which some or all
component population subgroups are assigned specific numbers of representa-
tives in the legislature or a specific turn in a rotating chief executive, or some
other assured political role in a consensual government, has been proposed for
ethnically divided polities, especially where great cultural gulfs between the
ethnic groups persist. Of course, formal power sharing, in logic, could tend to
reinforce the persistence of such cultural differences within the nation and even
differences in legal rights on the personal level, thus impeding assimilation and
also, perhaps, deterring redistributive changes within each group, which some
members may believe they need (for example, women in a Moslem community).
Indeed, this conservative effect is usually one of the aims of constitutionally
specified power sharing.
Constitutionally specified power sharing in recent decades has been adopted
where the religious gulfs within the overall population appeared unbridgeable
14. See infra note 25 on countries using proportional representation nationally.
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(Lebanon) or to protect the lives and economic and political interests of nationals
remaining behind when a colonial power departed (for example, the white mi-
nority of European descent in Rhodesia/Zimbabwe). In such cases it is again not
totally surprising that the typically disproportionate voting power or the control
per capita specified for some population subgroups has proved evanescent. In
some of the mature multiethnic nations in Europe, variants of constitutionally
specified power sharing have seemed to work satisfactorily (for example, in
Switzerland). However, not only has experience with formally specified power
sharing in the post colonial developing world been less successful, some failures
have been striking, such as Lebanon. In sum, where strong shared values and
mutual respect and trust are not highly developed, they cannot be readily im-
posed even by democratic governmental institutions.
Experience in the developing world thus suggests that, in some cases, pre-
scribed power sharing may well be essential. If it is, then like other quota
systems it should probably be designed to have a short life. It should be regarded
as a transitional aid to the development of the mutual concern and trust necessary
for more normal, unfettered democratic choice. The composite, post colonial
national state that is to be forged out of many subgroups would then gain time to
prepare for freer choice. Democratic stability and ethnic diversity are mutually
consistent when ethnic groups are able to subordinate ethnic loyalty to the com-
mon good of the nation, as defined by the shared institutions of government.
Where bargaining and sharing remain offensive or impossible in a divided,
mutually suspicious, disorderly multiethnic polity, stable democracy is unlikely
to last long. Furthermore, when we urge the potential utility of the development
of a national consciousness, we must also recall the disasters of the first half of
this century, ultimately resulting from intensely competitive nationalism, which
has been aptly described by Ashley Montague as the "tribal warfare" of the
Western World. 15
III. The United States' Example
To assure that power to decide would remain widely shared, so that minorities,
as well as majorities, could protect themselves, the U.S. Founding Fathers in-
corporated several well-known constitutional theories of the day into the design
of a federal government for what has evolved into a large, culturally heteroge-
neous democracy. 16 At the time, their witings espoused complex democratic
federal institutions with inbuilt checks and balances to impede usurpation of
power by all governmental entities and all subgroups and subregions, whether or
not in the majority. These strategies have included explicit division of powers
between levels of government and a separation of powers between executive,
15. Montague, On Tribalism Today, VISTA, Nov.-Dec. 1968, at 31, 41-42.
16. See supra note 9.
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legislative, and judicial branches, in a presidential system in which only the chief
executive at the federal level is chosen by the whole electorate.
For related reasons, they chose a bicameral legislature, including an upper
house not chosen by one person, one vote majority rule representative demo-
cratic voting weights. Instead, member states were given equal weight (two
senators each), whether heavily populated or sparsely populated, as if they and
their populations were equally important. Furthermore, the powerful, widely
responsible presidential executive was left dependent on this complex,
regionally-weighted, two-house legislature for budgetary support, including sup-
port of the military. It is no surprise that this explicit limitation on the President
in both domestic and foreign affairs has from time to time produced severe
tension and conflict between the chief executive and the legislature. The Con-
stitution also specified, loosely, the distribution of powers between the federal
government and the states and, of great importance, through a Bill of Rights,
assisted by the thirteenth to fifteenth amendments, specified broad limits on the
powers of all governments against their citizens.
In addition, the powers of the United States President, and of the federal and
state governments in general, were further limited de facto within a few years of
the adoption of the Constitution by the emerging power of a third arm, the
Supreme Court, whose members are appointed for life. That Court soon took the
constitutional opportunity left to it to assert a doctrine of constitutional review of
the acts of the legislative and executive branches in tests of constitutionality.
Again not unsurprisingly, from time to time conflict has erupted between the
United States Supreme Court's vision of the powers of the organs of federal
government and those of the President and even of those of the President and the
Congress acting together. For example, in the 1930s, President Roosevelt, faced
with a major economic emergency, threatened to pack the Court with his own
appointments by increasing the number of judges (the number is not fixed in the
Constitution). The Congress failed to support this suggestion. Roosevelt was
reelected by a landslide in 1936, and the Court seemed shortly to move to an
accommodation with the President's assertion of power to act in the emergency.
When no clear consensus emerges among the organs of government, such a
complex constitutional strategy, including inbuilt sets of checks and balances,
could prevent, impede, or delay effective central government action and create
a constitutional crisis. In this presidential type of system, there is no option in
case of a government stalemate to "go to the country," to call for an election that
would bring a new Congress or chief executive, much less a new judiciary. By
contrast, in the primary alternative model of democratic government, the par-
liamentary cabinet system (as in the United Kingdom), such severe conflicts
would probably lead eventually to the fall of the government. The hope would
be that the ensuing election would yield a replacement government with a
negotiated mandate. There is no guarantee, however, in a parliamentary system,
that deep cleavages within the electorate will be repaired simply by a new
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election.' 7 In the United Kingdom, too, the judiciary, while appointed by the
government, is reportedly independent in office; but it has not asserted a power
of constitutional review over Parliament and the government.
Where serious conflicts exist in a democracy, how long can internal govern-
mental wars persist without undermining the democratic structure? A democracy
with major persistent internal group conflicts among those with the effective
franchise is unlikely to function well over the long run; it may be unable to
defend itself from wallowing in inaction or falling apart, possibly inviting an
internal totalitarian take-over by a tyrannous minority or majority. Stalemate is of
course possible in both major types of democratic institutional designs, the
presidential and the parliamentary, if the minimal essential willingness to coop-
erate under binding, shared, consensual governmental institutions is absent.
IV. Twentieth Century Democratic Constitutions
Whereas the late eighteenth century United States Constitution focused on
political liberties, most national constitutions of the second half of the twentieth
century express official concern and make official commitments concerning eco-
nomic democracy, including the right to work, to fair wages, to social security,
to education, and the like.1 8 They add the economic dimension to the list of
rights of the individual and subgroups that is to be defended constitutionally by
the government machinery. This trend is a recognition of the importance of
economic independence and economic security to effective freedom (meaning
the existence of genuine alternatives).
As many have pointed out, the rich and poor are equally free to sleep under the
bridge. But they are not equally free. However, since economic assets are limited
at any one time, the political problems implicit in implementing these economic
dimensions of freedom are, if anything, more severe than concerns about re-
sponsible, fair, representative government and civil and political freedoms. That
has to be another article, but we can note here that economic rights are empow-
ering and therefore should, when achieved, facilitate widespread participation in
government and perhaps more personal equality and less hierarchy, even in
17. For example, the parliamentary systems of France through the first half of this century and
of Israel today suggest some of the problems of forming coalitions and weakness through division
into many splinter parties.
18. A commentator has noted, in connection with the creation of the Greek Constitution of 1952,
that it:
lacked the style of modem constitutions. It established a democratic and liberal state
that bore, however, the characteristics of a state of law (Rechtstaat) at a time when the
social state (Sozialstaat) had already been realized. The social state protects not only
classical individual rights but also other established values-that is, the freedom to
work, the importance of the family and of the social and natural environment and the
social significance of property.
Tsatsos, Making the Constitution of Greece, in CONSTITUTION MAKERS, supra note 4, at 69, 73-74.
See infra note 29 for current constitutions that include economic rights.
VOL. 24, NO. 3
PROBLEMS OF DESIGNING STABLE DEMOCRACIES 701
developed democracies. At present, unequal interpersonal economic power per-
sists in all countries.
With the foregoing discussion as background to the challenges of designing an
effective democratic constitution in the twentieth century, we turn now to explore
some of the specific provisions of the current set of some 136 national consti-
tutions to which we have had access, constitutions that are still relevant in the
closing decades of this century, in order to see how they have formally under-
taken to achieve and maintain stable democratic government. 19 We have alluded
19. Materials on practice are derived from the results of an ongoing analysis of 136 national
constitutions (plus three countries lacking constitutions, eight in which the constitution was sus-
pended, and two in which the Koran is the constitution). This is part of a project on Democracy and
Multiethnic Societies now in progress with Rita F. Taubenfeld and Howard J. Taubenfeld as prin-
cipal investigators. See also H. VAN MAARSEVEEN & G. VAN DER TANG, WRIITEN CONSTITUTIONS:
A COMPUTERIZED COMPARATIVE STUDY (1978) (an important survey of some 157 constitutions or
constitutional documents). For a collection of the world's constitutions, see [Binders l--XVII],
Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Oceana) (looseleaf; various dates).
The constitutions surveyed and that form the basis of the numbers and percentages used herein are
those of (the first number is the year of adoption; the second is that of the year last reviewed for
changes): Afghanistan (1980) (1980); Albania (1976) (1980); Algeria (1986) (1986); Angola (1975)
(1980); Antigua and Barbuda (1981) (1981); Argentina (1853) (1982); Australia (1900) (1986);
Austria (1975) (1984); Bahrain (1973) (1984); Barbados (1966) (1968); Belize (1961) (1981); Benin
(1977) (1980); Bolivia (1967) (1986); Botswana (1966) (1984); Brazil (1969) (1969); Bulgaria
(1971) (1973); Brunei (Darussalam) (1983) (1986); Burma (1974) (1981); Burundi (1981) (1981);
Cameroon (1972) (1986); Canada (1982) (1983); Cape Verde (1980) (1981); Central African Re-
public (1981) (1981); Chad (1983) (1983); Chile (1980) (1980); China, Peo. Rep. (1982) (1982);
Colombia (1886) (1976); Comores (Islamic Fed. Rep.) (1978) (1978); Congo (Peo. Rep. Brazzaville)
(1979) (1979); Costa Rica (Rep. of) (1949) (1981); Cote d'lvoire (1959) (1986); Cuba (1976) (1979);
Cyprus (1960) (1972); Czechoslovakia (1960) (1973); Denmark (1953) (1982); Djibouti (1977)
(1979); Dominica (1979) (1979); Dominican Rep. (1966) (1972); Ecuador (1979) (1987); Egypt
(1980) (1983); El Salvador (1983) (1984); Equatorial Guinea (1982) (1982); Ethiopia (1955) (1984);
Fiji (1970) (1986); Finland (1967) (1981); France (1958) (1973); Gabon (1970) (1983); Gambia
(1970) (1982); German Dem. Rep. (1968/74) (1986); Germany, Fed. Rep. (1949) (1984); Greece
(1975) (1975); Guatemala (1986); Guinea-Bissau, Rep. (1984) (1984); Guyana, Co-op. Rep. (1980)
(1980); Haiti (1987) (1987); Honduras (1982) (1982); Hungarian Peo. Rep. (1949) (1975); Iceland
(1944) (1973); India (1949) (1986); Indonesia (1945) (1973); Iran (1979) (1980); Ireland (1937)
(1982); Israel (1948) (1986); Italy (1947) (1986); Jamaica (1962) (1982); Japan (1947) (1972); Jordan
(1971) (1983); Kampuchea, Dem. (1976) (1982); Kampuchea, Peo. Rep. (1981) (1982); Kenya
(1979) (1985); Kiribati (1979) (1985); Korea, Rep. (1948) (1987); Korea, North (1972) (1973);
Kuwait (1962) (1970); Liberia (1984) (1984); Luxembourg (1968) (1984); Malawi (1966) (1983);
Malaysia (1957) (1984); Maldives, The (1968) (1985); Mali (1974) (1982); Malta (1964) (1985);
Mauritius (1968) (1985); Monaco (1962) (1985); Mongolia (1960) (1980); Morocco (1972) (1979);
Mozambique (1975) (1983); Nauru (1968) (1985); Nepal (1961) (1984); Netherlands, The (1983)
(1983); Norway (1814) (1975); Pakistan (1973) (1985); Panama (1972) (1980); Papua New Guinea
(1975) (1984); Paraguay (1967) (1982); Peru (1979) (1985); Philippines (1986) (1986); Poland
(1979) (1985); Portugal (1976) (1986); Qatar (1970) (1972); Romania (1978) (1987); Rwanda (1979)
(1979); Sao Tome and Princepe (1975) (1975); Senegal (1963) (1985); Seychelles (1979) (1981);
Sierra Leone (1978) (1978); Singapore (1963) (1980); Solomon Islands (1977) (1978); Somalia
(1979) (1980); South Africa (1983) (1986); Spain (1978) (1979); Sri Lanka (1978) (1985); St.
Christopher and Nevis (1983) (1983); St. Lucia (1978) (1978); St. Vincent (1979) (1979); Sudan
(1985) (1986); Suriname (1982) (1983); Swaziland (1978) (1987); Sweden (1976) (1984); Switzer-
land (1874) (1982); Syria (1973) (1974); Taiwan (1947) (1980); Thailand (1978) (1979); Trinidad and
Tobago (1976) (1983); Tunisia (1957) (1976); Turkey (1980) (1983); Tuvalu (1986) (1987); United
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above to some inherent design problems of democratic, responsible government
and to some alternative strategies for minimizing them. As noted, many of these
problems and coping strategies were already well explored by the designers of
the American Constitution in such places as the Federalist Papers. What provi-
sions have the constitution writers since then made to answer their needs? In each
case, we describe briefly the issue and then the way various current constitutions
have attempted to resolve it.
A. SOME ALTERNATIVE BASIC STRUCTURES
AND BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT
(1) Should the finally achieved agreement be embodied in a written constitu-
tion, as it is in the United States, a series of laws and documents specifically
labeled as "basic" laws, or in all the acts of the legislature (and, perhaps, the
executive)? Some 90 percent of the nations have opted for written constitutions.
A few rely on combined basic laws. 20 A very few, notably the United Kingdom,
consider all legislative acts as part of the living constitution. 2 1 In theory, at least,
this permits Parliament to change the "constitution" by majority voting whim.
(2) Should the system of government be federal or unitary? The American
federal model has not been widely adopted. Nearly 90 percent of present gov-
ernments are unitary.2 2 Other large, diverse nations such as the USSR, Canada,
and India, together with a few unions of quite diverse populations, for example,
Switzerland, are the principal federal states. Perhaps the figures will change to
some degree as ethnically diverse states (South Africa is an example) 23 become
more democratic.
States of America (1789) (1990); USSR (1977) (1978); Vanuatu (1961) (1971); Venezuela (1961)
(1983); Vietnam, Soc. Rep. (1980) (1981); Yemen, People's Dem. Rep. (1986) (1986); Yugoslavia
(1974) (1986); Zaire (1983) (1986); Zambia (1973) (1985); Zimbabwe (1979) (1987).
20. Of the nations surveyed above only the following lacked a written constitution, relying on
a multidocument approach: Israel, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom. In addition, constitutions
were suspended under martial law in Bangladesh, Burkino Faso, Grenada (1983), Laos, Lesotho,
Mauritania, Niger, Sudan, Uganda. In Libya and Saudi Arabia the Koran is the constitution.
21. British courts and writers have often referred to the basic or inherent rights of an Englishman.
No court has found any Act of Parliament to derogate from such rights and hence, presumably, to be
unenforceable. Lacking a bill of rights, a number of U.K. citizens have turned to the European
Community's Human Rights Commission and Court to bring human rights complaints against the
United Kingdom government.
22. Federal States include: Australia, Austria, Canada, Germany (Fed. Rep.), India, Malaysia,
Switzerland, The United States, and USSR.
23. See supra note 11. On futures for South Africa, see H. ADAM, ETHNIC POWER MOBILIZED:
CAN SOUTH AFRICA CHANGE? (1979); A WAY OUT: FEDERALIST OPTIONS FOR SOUTH AFRICA (M. Bri-
and ed. 1987); F. KENDALL & L. Louw, AFTER APARTHEID: THE SOLUTION FOR SOUTH AFRICA
(1987); A. LIJPHART, supra note 12; R. TAUBENFELD & H. TAUBENFELD, supra note 11; van der
Merwe & Meyer, Negotiation and Mediation in South Africa, in WILLIAMSBURG: THE TURNING POINT
FOR SOUTH AFRICA? (1989).
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(3) Is separation of church and state provided for, with or without, an estab-
lished church? Most nations provide for religious diversity.
24
(4) Should the central executive organization be independent of the other
branches as, for example, in the U.S. system? Over 90 percent of the nations do
not declare the independence of the executive.
(5) Is the court system provided for constitutionally? It is so provided in some
80 percent of the nations, with 95 percent having some form of central judicial
organ.
(6) Should the central judicial organ be separate from the other branches? This
independence takes different forms, but is widely accepted as important. Some
74 percent of constitutions declare the central judicial organ to be independent.
(7) For a central legislative organ, should there be one or more houses? Here
the division is more equal; some 60 percent have a single legislative organ. A
dual legislature, as in the United States, obviously facilitates weighted voting, as
provided by the U.S. Senate, on other than a one person, one vote rule.
(8) Should the executive have the right to dissolve the legislative organ? This,
of course, would be the norm in a parliamentary system like that of the United
Kingdom. Over 50 percent have adopted this device.
(9) How should the central representative body (or its houses) be elected? In
a transition period? In the long term? By popular, general vote? Minimum age
limits? Minimum property limits? Minimum educational qualifications? Without
popular vote, by appointment? As representatives of states, provinces, socio-
economic sectors? By cultural, ethnic, or racial sectors? Here the constitutions
differ widely. 25 On this crucial issue of whose choices or preferences count, and
24. Religious diversity is expressly constitutionally protected in: Afghanistan; Albania; Angola;
Antigua; Argentina; Barbados; Belize; Benin; Bolivia; Botswana; Comores; Costa Rica; Cyprus;
Czechoslovakia; Denmark; Dominican Rep.; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial Guinea; Ethi-
opia; Fiji; Finland; Gabon; Gambia; German Dem. Rep.; Germany, Fed. Rep.; Greece; Guatemala;
Guinea-Bissau; Guyana; Haiti; Honduras; Iceland; India; Indonesia; Ireland; Italy; Jamaica; Japan;
Jordan; Kampuchea, Dem.; Kampuchea, Peo.'s Rep.; Kiribati; Korea, Rep.; Korea, North; Kuwait;
Liberia; Luxembourg; Malaysia; Mali; Malta; Monaco; Mongolia; Morocco; Mozambique; Nauru;
Nepal; Netherlands, The; Norway; Pakistan; Panama; Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philip-
pines; Poland; Portugal; Romania; Rwanda; Sao Tome; Senegal; Seychelles; Singapore; Somalia;
Spain; Sri Lanka; St. Lucia; Sudan; Suriname; Sweden; Switzerland; Syria; Taiwan; Thailand; Trin-
idad; Turkey; Tuvalu; United States of America; Venezuela; Vietnam; Yemen, Peo. Rep.; Yugoslavia;
Zaire; Zambia; and Zimbabwe.
A number of these, however, proclaim the ascendancy of one religion: Islam: Kuwait, Malaysia,
Morocco, Somalia, Yemen, Peo. Rep.; Roman Catholic: Argentina, Bolivia, Costa Rica, Malta,
Monaco, Panama; Eastern Orthodox: Greece; Lutheran: Iceland, Norway.
25. As noted, the majority of constitutions provide for a unicameral legislature. At least forty-
seven are bicameral, with bases for election or appointment varying widely. For example: Antigua:
Senate-all appointed; Reps-direct, popular election; Argentina: Senate-2 per province, ap-
pointed by provincial legislators; Deps-direct, by population; Australia: Senate-6, each state-
direct; Reps-direct by population; Austria: Council-direct by population; federal council-direct
by states; Barbados: Senate-appointed; Assembly-direct; Belize: Senate-appointed; Reps-
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for how much, many varieties exist, and more have existed (e.g., property
qualifications were once more popular). Frequently, as in the United States, a
mixed strategy is chosen, giving unique weights to individuals; one house is
based on population, the other on a different principle, for example, territorial
division (as in the U.S. Senate). Where other potentially nonobjective qualifi-
cations for voting are implied (e.g., literacy, official language literacy, educa-
tion, race), control of the criteria applied, and the administration of the criteria
also affect the voting weights de facto.
(10) For the court system, should the decisions of the highest court be final on
constitutional and legislative issues? (We are not final because we are infallible;
we are infallible because we are final-to paraphrase a Justice of the United
States Supreme Court,) In the constitutions surveyed, only 14 percent make such
decisions constitutionally final, the will of the legislature alone or in conjunction
with the executive apparently being considered more appropriate to the final say.
(11) What are the rights of, and limits on, smaller governmental units below
the state or major component level-cities, provinces, districts, regions, depart-
direct; Bolivia: Senate-3 from each state and 2 from majority; Deps-direct by population;
Botswana: House of Chiefs-8 from tribes, 3 by chiefs; Brazil: Senate-3 per state; Deps-direct
by population; Canada: Senate-7 from each province; Commons-direct by province; Chile:
Senate-2 each from 13 regions and high-ranking ex-government personnel; Deputies-direct;
Cyprus: Communal Chamber-I Greek, I Turkish; Reps-70 percent by Greek community,
30 percent by Turkish community; Czechoslovakia: Chamber of Nations-50 percent elected by
D. Czech Soc. Rep., 50 percent elected by D. Slovak Soc. Rep.; Chamber of People-direct;
Dominican Republic: Senate-I for each province; Deps- I per 50,000 inhabitants; Fiji: Senate-
all appointed; Reps-22 elected from Fijian roll, 22 from Indian roll, 8 from other roll; France:
Senate- 24, Indirect; Deps-direct; Iceland: Both by proportional representation; Ireland: Senate-
3 by Nat'l Univ. of Ireland, 3 by Univ. of Dublin, 43 from panels of candidates, I I nominated by
Taoiseach; Dail-direct, proportional representation; Italy: Senate-universal; Reps-universal; Ja-
naica: Senate-all appointed; Reps-elected in manner provided by law (both houses now consist
of elected members, representative of all the people); Liberia: Senate-2 members from each
country; Malaysia: Senate-44, 2 from each state, 2 for federal territory; Reps-proportional rep-
resentation; Netherlands: I st Chamber-indirect; 2nd Chamber-direct, proportional representation;
Norway: direct, proportional representation; Pakistan: Senate- 19 elected, 2 appointed; Reps-
direct; Panamia: Nat'l Leg. Council- 129, 4 per province, indirect; Reps-I from each municipality,
direct; Paraguay: Senate-elected direct; Deps-universal; Peru: Senate-elected; Deps-elected,
proportional representation; Philippines: Senate-elected, direct; Reps-proportional representa-
tion; Poland: Senate-elected, indirect; Reps-direct; St. Lucia: Senate-all appointed by Gov.
Gen.; Reps-elected direct; Swaziland: Senate-10 elected by House, 10 appointed by King;
Reps-indirect; Switzerland: Council of States-2 per Canton; National Council-direct, propor-
tional representation; Thailand: Senate-appointed by King; House-group voting by Changwat,
direct, proportional representation; United States of America: Senate-2 from each state; House-
members apportioned among the several states according to population; Venezuela: Senate-2 from
each state direct, 2 from federal district, representation of minorities as established by law, all former
presidents of the Republic; Chamber of Deputies-direct; proportional representation of minorities;
Yugoslavia: Fed. Chamber-30 delegates of self-managing organizations & communities & socio-
political organizations from each republic, 20 delegates from each autonomous Province; Chamber
of Republics & Provinces- 12 delegates of each Republican assembly, 8 delegates of each Provincial
assembly; Zimbabwe: Senate-24 elected by electoral college, consisting of the members of the
House of Assembly, 10 chiefs elected by electoral colleges consisting of those chiefs who are
members of the Council of Chiefs, 6 appointed by the President; House of Assembly-80 members
elected by voters registered on the common roll, 20 by registered voters on the white roll.
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ments, or others? These are rarely specified; constitutionally they are alluded to
only in some federal systems such as that of the United States, where powers not
allocated to the federal government are reserved to "the people," as well as to
the states, by the tenth amendment.
(12) In a federation or confederation, how should the powers be divided between
all levels of government? Since 90 percent of the nations are legally unitary, only a
few constitutions touch on this question, and those, as with the tenth amendment and
the commerce clause of the United States Constitution, are typically relatively vague.
(13) Is the constitution superior to ordinary legislation? This fundamental
concept of the U.S. approach appears to be the rule in some two-thirds of other
constitutions. 26 How can constitutional guarantees be protected if they can be
changed by ordinary legislation?
(14) Can legislation be reviewed by courts? On what grounds or criteria? Less
than half of the constitutions confirm review as a right. In the others the exec-
utive or the legislature, or some combination, presumably has the final word on
constitutional issues. Again, this latter approach would lend itself to a watering
down of constitutional guarantees.
(15) Is a special court for constitutional challenges appropriate? Some 75 per-
cent of the constitutions say no.
(16) Should the constitution be fixed, or amendable? Is the nation indissolu-
ble? In general, amendments are acceptable. But a few, three or four constitu-
tions, prohibit them. On exit by component parts, most provide for indissolu-
bility. The Soviet Constitution has always stressed the free association of the
constituent republics. Obviously, the events of 1989-90, in the Baltic areas and
elsewhere, are heretofore unheard of challenges to this guarantee and to Great
Russian hegemony. In the United States in 1861-65, in Indonesia in the late
1940s and 1950s, and in Nigeria, we have seen the refusal of federated or once
federated states to suffer dissolution or dismemberment.
(17) Is the constitution suspendable? Some 65 percent say yes, which may be
still another legal way to subvert human rights protections in the constitutions.
B. PROTECTION FROM TYRANNY
(1) Is there a written bill of rights providing for limits to government authority
over the citizenry? Does it provide for: equality before the law, including, inter
26. Thus many constitutions provide for a Supreme Court which has authority, of varying
degrees, to deal with constitutional issues: Bahrain; Belize; Cape Verde; Costa Rica; Cote d'Ivoire;
Cyprus; Dominica; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Fiji; Gabon; Gambia; Germany, Fed. Rep.; Gua-
temala; Guyana; Honduras; India; Ireland; Italy; Jamaica; Japan; Kiribati; Korea, Rep.; Liberia;
Malawi; Mali; Malta; Mauritius; Monaco; Morocco; Mozambique; Nauru; Nepal; Pakistan; Panama;
Papua New Guinea; Paraguay; Philippines; Poland; Portugal; Rwanda; Sao Tome; Senegal; Solomon
Islands; Somalia; Spain; South Africa; St. Lucia; St. Vincent; Sudan; Syria; Trinidad and Tobago;
Turkey; Tuvalu; United States of America; Vanuatu; Venezuela; Yugoslavia; and Zaire.
The Netherlands provides that the constitutionality of acts of Parliament shall not be reviewed by
the courts. The Netherlands, [Binder X] Constitutions of the Countries of the World (Oceana) art. 120
(Jan. 1984).
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alia, rights of fair arrest, fair trial, habeas corpus, and other rights of defendants
in criminal cases; rights to petition, to assemble, to associate; rights to a free press;
no discrimination based on sex, religion, race, caste, ethnic origin, or other dif-
ferences; equal treatment of all, so that all may develop their fullest capacities,
no matter, for example, where they live; freedom of expression; and rights to
property? Many of the constitutions provide formally for a bill of rights embod-
ying these kinds of concerns. 27 Many others include broad statements requiring
equal treatment of all citizens (presumably meaning equally good treatment).
(2) Is the widespread right to vote included? Is it limited by unequal require-
ments? Most nations provide for a widespread vote by all above a specified age,
except for those limited by prison sentence or the like. The weights vary; some-
times a mixed strategy is used as with the United States Congress. A secret ballot
is constitutionally provided for in some seventy-five countries.
(3) Are there protections against arbitrary administrative action? Are admin-
istrative actions subject to review at law? Are governmental actions, institutions,
and documents open for public review? These are touchy concerns in all gov-
ernments; they are subjects rarely mentioned in current constitutions.
(4) Should there be rights of privacy? 28 Of free movement of persons inter-
nally? Of goods internally? Of persons in and out of the country? And between
political divisions, for example, of a federal state? These are now widely
27. Of the constitutions surveyed some 126 contain some form of a bill of rights. Those lacking
an identifiable bill of rights are: Australia, Brunei, Chad, Djibuti, Mauritania, South Africa, Swa-
ziland, and the United Kingdom.
In the constitutions, 101 provide in general terms for equal treatment for all citizens. In addition,
with or without such a general statement, governmental discrimination is specifically constitutionally
barred on grounds of: race-81; color-33; origin or place of birth-69; sex-73; religion or
creed-82; language-19; residence-5; tribe-6; occupation-6; social position or class-37;
wealth or economic station- 10; kinship--3; education- 12; political opinions or affiliations-40;
or ethnic group- 15.
28. Many constitutions protect: (A) a right to privacy, broadly construed, to be secure in one's
property; (B) one's home; (C) one's papers; (D) to be free from unwarranted searches; and (E) to
have a private life. The letter(s) following the country's name identifies the provision(s) contained in
their respective constitutions: Afghanistan B; Albania ABC; Algeria BC; Angola BC; Antigua AD;
Argentina A; Barbados ABD; Bahrain B; Belize ABCD; Benin B; Bolivia ABC; Botswana ABCD;
Comores B; Costa Rica ABCD; Congo C; Cyprus ABCD; Czechoslovakia ABC; Cuba ABC; Den-
mark ABCD; Dominica AD; Dominican Rep. ABCD; Ecuador BCDE; Egypt BCE; El Salvador
ABCD; Ethiopia B; Equatorial Guinea ABCD; Fiji ABCD; Finland ABCD; Gabon ABCD; Gambia
ABCD; German Dem. Rep. ABC; Germany, Fed. Rep. C; Greece ABCD; Guatemala ABC; Guinea
Bissau BC; Guyana ABCD; Haiti ACD; Honduras ABCDE; Iceland ABCD; Iran C; Ireland AB; Italy
BCD; Jamaica ABDE; Japan ABCD: Jordan ABC; Kampuchea BCD; Kenya AD; Kiribati ABCD;
Korea, Rep. ABCD; Korea, North BC; Kuwait ABCD; Liberia ABCDE; Luxembourg ABC; Ma-
laysia A; Maldives, The ABCD; Mali AB; Malta ABCE; Mauritius AB; Monaco ABCDE; Mongolia
ABD; Morocco BCD; Mozambique BC; Nauru ABCDE; Nepal A; Netherlands, The ABCD; Norway
ABD; Pakistan AB; Panama ABC; Paraguay B; Papua New Guinea ACDE; Paraguay ABCDE; Peru
ABCE; Philippines ABCD; Poland ABD; Portugal ABCDE; Qatar AB; Romania BCD; Rwanda
ABCE; Sao Tome BCD; Senegal ABCD; Seychelles D; Sierra Leone ABE; Solomon Islands AB;
Somalia ABCD; Spain ABD; St. Christopher & Nevis ABDE; St. Lucia ABCDE; St. Vincent ABD;
Sudan ABCD; Suriname BCD; Sweden ACD; Switzerland C; Syria ABC; Taiwan AC; Thailand AB;
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included as constitutional aspirations, although some provide only for freedom of
internal movement.
29
(5) Are economic rights provided for, that is, is the government constitution-
ally charged with overseeing the economic and social welfare of its population?
Does this include such matters as rights to an adequate or decent standard of
living? To education? To medical care? To a job? To unionize, to strike? To
freedom in social life, cultural life, academic or artistic freedom? To a right to
just or equal payment for work? To a comprehensive system of social security?
The newer constitutions tend to include these concerns, although some nine-
teenth century constitutions do so as well.30
C. SPECIAL CONCERNS
(1) Are there group rights? A right to autonomy? To secession? To use one or
more official languages? To more than one taught language? To preservation of
Trinidad AD; Tunisia A; Turkey AC; Tuvalu A; United States of America ABCD; Vanuatu C;
Venezuela ACD; Vietnam AB; Yemen, Peo. Rep. BC; Yugoslavia BC; Zaire ABCD; Zambia ACD;
Zimbabwe BCD.
29. Free movement within and without the state is provided for by the constitutions of (* denotes
within only): Algeria; Antigua; Argentina; Barbados; Belize; Benin; Bolivia; Comores; Costa Rica;
Cyprus; Czechoslovakia; Dominica; Dominican Rep.; Ecuador; Egypt; El Salvador; Equatorial
Guinea; Ethiopia; Fiji; Finland; Gambia; German Dem. Rep.*; Germany, Fed. Rep.; Greece; Gua-
temala; Guyana; India; Italy; Jamaica; Jordan*; Kenya; Kiribati; Korea, Rep.; Kuwait; Liberia;
Malaysia; Maldives, The; Malta; Mauritius; Morocco*; Nepal*; Pakistan*; Panama*; Papua New
Guinea; Paraguay; Peru; Philippines; Portugal; Rwanda; Senegal*; Seychelles*; Sierra Leone;
Singapore*; Solomon Islands; Spain; St. Christopher & Nevis; St. Lucia; St. Vincent; Sudan; Swe-
den; Syria; Taiwan; Thailand*; Trinidad; Tunisia; Turkey; Tuvalu; Vanutu; Venezuela; Vietnam;
Yemen, Peo. Rep.; Yugoslavia; Zaire; Zambia; Zimbabwe.
30. The constitutions of the following countries contain, for example, provisions concerning a
right: (A) to work; (B) to practice a profession; (C) to unionize; (D) to an education; (E) to medical
care; (F) to social security; (G) to rest and leisure; (H) to housing or adequate standard of living;
(I) to culture; (J) to develop one's personality, and similar provisions. The letter(s) following the
country's name identifies the provision(s) contained in their respective constitutions: Afghanistan
ADF; Albania ABDEFGI; Algeria ACDEFGHIJ; Angola ADFIJ; Argentina AF; Bahrain C; Belize
A; Benin ADEFG; Bolivia ADF; Bulgaria I; Burundi I; Cameroon I; Cape Verde I; Chile I; China,
Peo. Rep. I; Colombia I; Comores CD; Congo I; Costa Rica ABCDFGI; Cuba ADEFGHI; Cyprus
BDF; Czechoslovakia ADEG; Denmark AD; Dominican Rep. ACDEF; Ecuador ACDEFHI; Egypt
ACDEFI; El Salvador ACDEFGHI; Equatorial Guinea ADEFHI; Ethiopia ADEFGI; Fiji C; Finland
D; Gabon ADEFH; German Dem. Rep. ADEFGHIJ; Germany, Fed. Rep. BJ; Greece ACDJ; Gua-
temala ACDEFGI; Guinea-Bissau DF; Guyana ACDEFGH; Haiti ACDEFH; Honduras ACDFGH;
Hungary ACE; Iceland BF; India BCDGH; Indonesia ACD; Iran ABDFH; Ireland D; Italy ACDE-
FGI; Japan ACDEF; Jordan ACD; Kampuchea ADEG; Korea, Rep. ABCDEFH; Korea, North
ADEGI; Kuwait ACDFI; Liberia ACD; Luxembourg ADFG; Mali ABDFG; Malta ACDFGI; Mo-
naco ABCDF; Mongolia ACDEFGI; Morocco ACD; Mozambique ACD; Nepal C; Netherlands, The
ABDEFH; Norway A; Pakistan BDEFGH; Panama ACDEFGI; Papua BDFH; Paraguay ACEGJ; Peru
ABCDEFGHIJ; Philippines DE; Poland ACDEFGI; Portugal ABCDEFGHJ; Qatar DEF; Romania
ACDEFG; Rwanda ACD; Sao Tome ADEF; Senegal ACJ; Seychelles AB; Somali AD; Spain AB-
CDEFGHIJ; Sudan C; Suriname ADG; Sweden C; Switzerland DF; Syria ACDEFG; Taiwan ABD;
Thailand D; Trinidad B; Tunisia C; Turkey HI; Venezuela ACFIJ; Vietnam ADEFGI; Yemen, Peo.
Rep. ABDEG; Yugoslavia ABDEFHI; Zaire B.
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ethnic and minority differences where desired? Certainly, persuasive or required
bilingualism and even multilingualism are recognized as essential in many coun-
tries today: Canada, Belgium, the USSR, among others, some thirteen in all.3 1
(2) Should there be constitutional provisions for affirmative action in some
form, that is, should historically deprived regions, persons, castes, ethnic or racial
groups, or religious, or gender-based, or other groups be mandated special as-
sistance and support? Should there be directly imposed redistribution of oppor-
tunity? A forced leveling upward? Should there be equal opportunity to develop
from birth for present and future generations manifested by a ban on institution-
alized unequal opportunity to develop and by very widespread access to education
from the earliest years? For better or worse, very few nations have embodied such
aspirations as rights in constitutions, though India and a few others have.
32
(3) Other very important constitutional questions a new democracy must face
include: if a federal, confederal, or series of new, independent states, with or
without economic ties (customs union? other?) is to be set up, how should the
division of the nation into federal units be drawn? Should there be autonomous
regions?33 Boundary issues, both internal and international, have historically
been crucial issues for peace. What sorts of links between confederal units are to
be imposed? Where will the ultimate power to tax lie? The power to conscript?
The power to raise and support an army? How will rights to economic resources,
including the developed exploitation of the natural wealth of, say, a future,
democratic, federal South Africa be allocated? 34 By what mode will it be shared?
Should there be ultimate federal control and power to ration development and
access to land and resources (surface, subsurface, or wherever located)? Will
there be any equalizing of access to resources between the new component
entities? By what mode?
In history there have been population transfers, asset transfers, international
oversight, commissions and commissioners for refugees, to none but a few so-
lutions. In practice, of course, there have been innumerable, repetitive, festering
boundary disputes throughout history. Ultimate control of developed and unde-
veloped resources has varied. The United States government, for example, has,
over the decades, distributed federal lands to those who would homestead and
work the land. It now leases subsoil rights and timbering rights, among others.
31. Bilingualism or the protection of more than one language is officially required by a number
of constitutions: Albania, Austria, Burma, Canada, Central African Rep., India, Italy, Pakistan,
Panama, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Spain, Switzerland.
32. Affirmative action is provided in the Indian Constitution in an attempt to improve the status
of deprived castes and groups, but such a provision is a rarity. On India, see, e.g., Nariman, The Indian
Constitution: An Experiment in Unity Amid Diversity, in FORGING UNITY, supra note 4, at 7-37.
33. On autonomous regions, see H. HANNUM, AUTONOMY, SOVEREIGNTY AND SELF-
DETERMINATION: THE ACCOMMODATION OF CONFLICTING RIGHTS (1990); J. PLAMENATZ, ON ALIEN
RULE AND SELF-GOVERNMENT (1960). On autonomy in Spain, see, e.g., Linz, Spanish Democracy
and the Estado de las Autonomias, in FORGING UNITY, supra note 4, at 260-303.
34. See supra note 23.
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(4) One last, but seemingly vital, requisite is the requirement for permitting
institutionalized change. Ultimately no democratic constitution will long remain
democratic that permanently leaves any significant interest group walled outside
the government apparatus. This inescapable fact is the ultimate justification for
an adequately flexible constitution, and points to a very important, or even
overriding, constitutional norm: To be stable, a constitution has to be designed to
change, to evolve with the population so that legitimate subgroups will be ap-
propriately represented in the national government. The United States Constitu-
tion, for example, provides for a census every ten years and reapportionment as
part of the internal mechanics of its flexibility over time and change. (A Supreme
Court that cautiously, in the words of Mr. Dooley, "follows the election re-
turns," is another, if less secure, possibility.)
V. Some Conclusions
In actual practice many more issues will concern the negotiators at a consti-
tutional assembly. This survey has focused on issues and institutions traditionally
believed to be crucial to stable consensual governments. Obviously, however,
not all the constitutions reviewed were from countries aspiring to Western-style
democratic institutions. Many were not. The similarity of expressed aspirations
and even of specified institutional arrangements is all the more striking therefore.
The fact that similar language appears in democratic and nondemocratic, includ-
ing communist, constitutions is significant recognition of their worldwide ac-
ceptance as appropriate human standards concerning good government, even if
these commitments tend to be ignored, in practice, in many nations. Obviously,
they achieve a life of their own and persist in the psyches of millions of people
who have never known the rights being honored only in the breech. How else can
one explain our new hopes from the great Perestroika spring?
The differences we do not find in the constitutions, but in the way they work,
are obviously very important: Does the leadership in fact regularly submit itself
to "the consent of the governed" in real contests with real choices that reflect the
needs and views of a very wide range of citizens? If so, they will have incentives
to satisfy as large a group of constituents as feasible and so will their opponents.
Such questions are only partly constitutional. In part they depend on how the
politicians and the constituents behave and on the actual political machinery, the
parties, their nomination processes, widespread voting rights, and honest elections.
The lessons of constitutional experience can be useful, and we are exploring
them in detail elsewhere. But, as noted, no one institutional formula has assured
success historically. The most important question then, for any emerging de-
mocracy with diverse constituencies is: Are the citizens and their leaders ready
to undertake the mutual commitment to make whatever constitution they nego-
tiate work democratically? There are no constitutional gimmicks that will cure
the problem. The appropriate immediate action issue is not what specific mech-
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anism or exact wording they should adopt at a constitutional convention, but
rather what can they do to learn to work together to prepare themselves for
workable democracy.
We have found constitutional promises surprisingly similar. Yet whether or not
a people's goals, their reach, should "exceed their grasp," it is true that few
countries can claim to fully live up to the glorious general aspirations expressed
in their constitutions. Indeed, in principle, since constitutional provisions are
likely to imply competing claims on limited national opportunities and resources,
not all potentially legitimate claims or claimants could be satisfied.
Whatever the constitution, the economic problem remains. Resources and
opportunities are limited. Not everybody who wants to lead the band or to be
president can be satisfied. Furthermore, quite likely, many potentially highly
qualified competitors exist simultaneously. Most must acquiesce in not being
chosen. In a broadly based democracy they, the unchosen, will have to get
something, too. Thus the stress on the importance of sharing and shared com-
mitment to democracy.
Ideas have power; constitutional ideas sanctified as the principal political
compact between a people and their government are very important in the ideo-
logical life of that community. Although perfect democracy is in principle un-
definable and unattainable, citizens prove willing to support ongoing approxi-
mations to good democratic government if the process seems adequately fair.
But even where democracy exists only as an aspiration in the words of the
constitution, the glowing promises obviously retain their magical allure. For
those who have been asking, "Where did Gorbachev come from?," this review
suggests a perhaps reassuring answer. He comes directly from the words, the
promises, of the Constitution of the USSR.
Will the states of Eastern Europe succeed in converting themselves into di-
verse democracies? Will their peoples be able to overcome the bitter legacies of
internal ethnic and religious conflicts that have, in some cases, already flared up
anew? Will they be able to develop the necessary commitments to sharing and to
mutual tolerance and to the capacity to cooperate that are essential to stable
democracy? This remains the challenge. With determination, the challenge
should not be overwhelming.
If constitutional promises are important, they are obviously not enough. If we
were forced to produce an operational guideline for leaders seeking to maintain
stable, broadly consensual democracies, on either the British or the U.S. model,
the first three rules would probably be: "co-opt, co-opt, co-opt," the politically
operational meaning of broad sharing in open democracy. This review of current
constitutions reminds us again that no one formula assures success. The most
essential constitutional building block for the creation of stable democracy re-
mains a common commitment to sharing and a firm intention to make stable
democracy work.
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